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1. Introduction
Security problems in satellite environments are one of the obstacles to the widespread
deployment of satellite IP multicast and, more generally, of satellite multimedia applications
(Cruickshank et al., 1998).
By satellite environments we refer to networks where the satellite plays an essential role. e.g.
those where it is used to multicast IP packets to many nodes of a terrestrial network. We also
speak of ”Hybrid Satellite/Terrestrial networks” in such cases.
The broadcast nature of satellites makes eavesdropping and active intrusion much easier
than in terrestrial ﾙxed or mobile networks. A further issue is speciﾙc to multicast: the
number of members in a multicast group can be very large and, even worse, can change
very dynamically. While the process of performing and securing key management for unicast
connections is well understood (Harkins & Carrel, 1998), (Maughan et al., 1998), (Orman,
1998), multicast security is still an open ﾙeld (see par. 2). Protocols that manage the process of
distributing keys in a multicast environment are under development (see par. 2.3 and 2.4).
Access to the encryption key is controlled by a group key management system, which is
responsible for sending the encryption key to authorized new users and for performing
multicast group rekeying whenever the key changes. Speciﾙcally, a group key management
system is said to implement two types of access control: backward access control and forward
access control. If the system changes the encryption key after a new user joins, the new user
will not be able to decrypt past group communications; this is called backward access control.
Similarly, if the system rekeys after a current user leaves, or is expelled from the system, the
departed user will not be able to access future group communications; this is called forward
access control.
Many group key management solutions (see par. 2.2, (Jokela, 2006) (Mah, 2004)) have
been proposed and a number of classiﾙcations of the available approaches can be found
in the current literature (Dondeti et al., 1999), (Rafaeli & Hutchison, 2003), (Eskicioglu,
2003). Moreover, security mechanisms regarding satellite networks have been investigated
in (Howarth et al., 2004), (Noubir & Allmen, 1999) and (Arslan & Alagöz, 2006).
Group key management protocols can be categorized as following:
 Centralized architectures. A single entity, a GC (Group Controller), is employed for
controlling the whole group, hence a group key management protocol seeks to minimize
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storage requirements, computational power on both client and server sides and bandwidth
utilization.
 Decentralized architectures. The management of a large group is divided among subgroup
managers, trying to reduce the problems arising from concentrating the work in a single
place.
 Distributed architectures. There is no explicit manager and the members themselves do the
key generation. All members can perform access control and the generation of the key can
be contributory, meaning that all members contribute some information to generate the
group key.
Rekey protocols should use a scalable Group Key Management Algorithm (GKMA) to send
the minimum possible number of keys in a rekey message. LKH (see par. 2.3), OFT (Balenson
et al., 2000), Subset difference based schemes (Lotspiech et al., 2001) are examples of GKMA.
Regardless of the chosen approach, rekeymessages are generally frequent and their reception
must be guaranteed in order for the multicast group members to avoid multicast services
interruptions.
RFC 4046 (Baugher et al., 2005) describes a Group Key Management Architecture and
proposes three classes of solutions for reliably sending keys to the multicast group members:
 repeatedly transmit the rekey message;
 use FEC for encoding rekey packets (with NACKs as feedback) (Yang et al., 2001);
 use an existing reliable multicast protocol/infrastructure (possibly proﾙting in a mixed
way from the above solutions).
Up to now, not much work has been dedicated to the use of reliable multicast transports for
rekey messages. In most cases ((Wong & Lam, 2000) (Zhang et al., 2003)) FEC (Rizzo, 1997)
has been used to improve the reliability.
RFC 4046 also identiﾙes the requirements a protocol for key transmission/rekeying must
satisfy:
 Reliability. Every user must receive all of its (encrypted) new keys, no matter how large the
group size.
 Soft real-time. It is required that the delivery of new keys to all users be ﾙnished with a high
probability before the start of the next rekeying.
 Scalability. The processing and bandwidth requirements of the key server and those of each
user should not increase much with the group size so that a single server is able to support
a large group.
Moreover, multicast key distribution must take care of the "feedback implosion" problem (see
par. 2.2.4 and (Baugher et al., 2005) resulting from NACKs or ACKs sent as feedback.
Satellite networks may intrinsically offer a serious alternative to terrestrial networks solutions
in that they can enable reliable multicast techniques to scale to large group of receivers. Such
advantage is an effect of their intrinsic properties such as: high bandwidth availability, their
broadcast nature and the reduced occurrence of congestion between sender and receivers as
compared to terrestrial networks.
With these considerations in mind, we focused our attention on the following protocols for the
multicast reliable transmission of encryption keys: Pragmatic General Multicast (PGM) (see
par. 3.1), NACK-Oriented Reliable Multicast (NORM) (see par. 3.2 ) and our SRDP-Sign (see
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par. 3.3). PGM was chosen for being an interesting IETF experimental protocol. While not yet
a standard, it has been implemented in some networking devices (such as Cisco routers) and
operating systems including MS Windows XP. NORM was chosen because RFC 4046 quotes
it as a well-suited protocol for reliable multicast of rekey messages.
In the following, paragraph 2 will detail the state of the art on the subject of multicast security
with a particular attention to the solutions based on a centralized approach, paragraph 3
will discuss some reliable multicast protocols with an interest in their utilization in satellite
networks. Paragraph 4 will present the preliminary results of some tests we conducted
with the aim of evaluating the performances of above listed reliable multicast protocols.
They have been tested on a hybrid satellite/terrestrial network in the speciﾙc case of
transmission/rekeying of keys for a multicast security environment.
2. Multicast security
The original conception of an IP network was aimed at the exchange of information between
two nodes. However, very soon the popularity of the Internet gave rise to a number of
applications for which a better model would be desirable. Such applications would beneﾙt
from a network direct support to the delivery of the same packets from one source to many
destinations. Some of them are today’s killer applications, e.g. IPTV. The need for multiple
unicast connections implied by the basic model made them simply not scalable enoughwithin
the original rules.
Around 1989, to address such problem the introduction of a new functionality was proposed
for IP networks: IP multicast (Deering, 1991) (Deering, 1989). As a result of it, an host wishing
to send the same packet to many hosts at the same time was allowed to output that single
packet on its network interface, leaving to the network’s routers the burden of duplicating
it wherever required. As an extreme example, a packet intended for a number of hosts on a
distant LAN would travel alone until the last router which would replicate it at the last hop
for as many hosts as needed.
The positive effect of such approach can be perceived, increasingly with the number of the
multicast groupmembers, both on the conservation of computational resources of the sending
machine and in the (potentially huge) savings of bandwidth resources in the network.
The idea required the introduction of a special class of IP addresses (Class D, from 224.0.0.0 to
239.255.255.255) each of them representing a "multicast group".
The essential protocol formanaging the multicast groupmembership is IGMP (Internet Group
Multicast Protocol) (Deering, 1989). It works without problems in a network where all the
routers support it. When support is spotty, more complex techniques are required (Semeria &
Maufe, 1997).
Although IP Multicast would be the ideal technique for many important applications (e.g. to
distribute real-time video on the Internet) for many well-known reasons it is not globally
supported on the Internet (Diot et al., 2000). There are indeed many ISPs supporting IP
multicast in their AS (Autonomous Systems) and multicast peering agreements are frequent
among ISPs but even then the common user isn’t left the faculty to send multicast trafﾙc to
other users in the same AS. Clearly this ability is regarded as a primary asset within an ISP
network and acquiring it (when available) can be subjected to substantial fees. Many methods
to overcome this limitation have been proposed (Eriksson, 1994) (MBONED, 2011) (Sardella,
2005) but none of them has proved very successful until now.
85
Multicast Security and Reliable Transport of
Rekey Messages over Hybrid Satellite/Ter es rial N works
www.intechopen.com
4 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
A natural way to transmit IP multicast over a large geographical area is satellite broadcasting
(Tommasi et al., 2010)(Tommasi & C.Melle, 2011).
Among the many applications made possible by the multicast model are those for which
security is a critical requirement. Without going too far, the very same IPTV application,
when run to pursue economic goals, needs a method to allow only paying customers to access
transmitted contents. However many other situations where security is a crucial factor can be
imagined (especially in the ﾙelds of control and signaling).
According to a recommendation from International Standards Organization (ISO) (ISO
7498-2, 1989), while designing a secure system the following criteria are to be considered:
conﾙdentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation and access control. To meet such
criteria in an IP multicast environment, a Multicast Security (MSEC) Workgroup (MSEC,
2011) has been formed within the IETF, with the aim of standardizing protocols for securing
group communication over the Internet. Obviously enough, a fundamental topic in the
workgroup’s activities is the standardization of a group key management architecture. The
present paragraph will make use of many of the results coming from the group’s efforts and
documented so far.
2.1 The multicast group security architecture
The description of the security architecture for IP multicast group communications involves
a number of aspects. To reduce the complexity of the presentation, the proposed protocols
are grouped in three functional areas, each addressing an aspect of the solution. RFC
3740 (Hardjono & Weis, 2004) outlines the Reference Framework formulated by the IETF
Workgroup and identiﾙes such areas (see Fig. 1):
1. Multicast data handling. This area includes all the operations on the multicast data
performed by the sender and the receiver. Such handling implements:
 Encryption. To support access control and conﾙdentiality, data are encrypted by the use
of the group key.
 Source authentication and data integrity. Source identity must be guaranteed by suitable
algorithms. Steps are also to be taken to secure the integrity of the received contents.
 Group authentication. This is a minor requirement (guaranteeing the data come
from within a group does not necessarily indicate their integrity). However such
authentication is very easily achieved and prevents DOS (Denial of Service) attacks.
2. Group Key Management. This is the area where secure key distribution and the refresh
operations are dealt with.
3. Multicast Security Policies. According to (Hardjono &Weis, 2004) Multicast Security Policies
represent "the security mechanisms for the group communication" and "the rules for the
governance of the secure group".
The Framework also identiﾙes the main elements of a multicast security architecture both in
a centralized and in a distributed solution. A central role is played by the "Group Controller"
and by the "Key Server". Such entities are usually merged in a single server (GCKS) which is
responsible for the "Group Key Management" functional area. Senders and receivers (called
GM, Group Members) do interact both with GCKS and with the "Policy server", which is in
charge of the "Multicast Security Policies" area.
In order to increase the scalability of the architecture, a distributed approach (see Fig. 1), based
on a number of cooperating GCKS, can be opted for. In such case mutual authentication must
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be guaranteed among GCKS. In a distributed system all receivers will comply with the same
security policies and receive the same keys.
Group Controller/
Key Server
Group Controller/
Key Server
Sender
Receiver
Receiver
Policy
Server
Policy
Server
1 to M
M to M
1 to M
M to M
CENTRALIZED DESIGN DISTRIBUTED DESIGN
MULTICAST 
SECURITY 
POLICIES
GROUP KEY 
MANAGEMENT
MULTICAST 
DATA 
HANDLING
FUNCTIONAL 
AREAS
Fig. 1. Multicast Group Security Architecture (from (Hardjono et al., 2001))
2.2 Group Key Management Architecture
The GroupKeyManagement Architecture (Hardjono&Weis, 2004) deﾙnes the Group Security
Association (GSA) and the main features of the registration and the rekey protocols.
2.2.1 Group Security Association (GSA)
In a protocol designed tomanage security on an end-to-end connection, such as IPSEC (Kent &
Atkinson, 1998), a Security Association (SA) is a set of shared attributes used by the two ends
to secure the connection. Such attributes consist of cryptographic keys, algorithm, identiﾙers
and everything else needed to conduct the communication.
The complexity of a multicast environment imposes the need for more than one key to secure
a session. In this context the notion of Group Security Association (GSA) (see Fig. 2) is
introduced (Hardjono & Weis, 2004) (Hardjono et al., 2001), which stands for a group of SAs
related to the session. SAs in a GSA belong to three different categories:
 REG SA (Registration SA) is used to set up a full-duplex unicast communication channel
between GCKS and a GM. GMs start the registration phase by obtaining all needed
information directly fromGCKS. REG SA is used to protect the other SAs and cannot be set
apart from them. It is important to note that no special communication protocol is strictly
required here or, for that matter, no communication protocol at all, since a REG SA can
even be set up in advance by using a smart card.
 REKEY SA is a multicast security association and it is used to create/renew an SA or to
revoke access permission to a GM. It is started by the GCKS with no need of feedback from
GMs sharing the same REKEY SA. Contrary to REG SA, it is not always present in GSA. In
fact, the lifetime of a group may happen to be so short to make it useless.
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 DATA SA (Data Security SA). As for the previous one, no negotiation is needed. It is
created by the GCKS to protect the trafﾙc of data ﾚowing from the senders to receivers.
GCKS
Member
(Receiver)
Member
(Sender)
REG SA
Initial Setup
(unicast)
REG SA
Initial Setup
(unicast)
DATA SA
Data Messages
(multicast)
REKEY SA
Control Messages
(multicast)
OPTIONAL
Fig. 2. Group Security Association (GSA ) Structure (from (Hardjono et al., 2001))
By using the registration protocol each GM get the authorization and the authentication
needed to access a group, to comply with its policies and to obtain its keys. There are two
types of keys: Key Encryption Keys, KEK, needed to send keys in a secure way, and Trafﾙc
Encryption Keys, TEK, used to encrypt actual trafﾙc. Also a Trafﾙc-Protection Key (TPK) is
used, which combines a TEK and a trafﾙc integrity key. KEKs are relevant in a REKEY SA and
TEKs/TPKs are relevant in a DATA SA.
2.2.2 Registration protocol
An entity desiring to become a GM will have to use a registration protocol on an unicast
connection with the GCKS. The protocol involves mutual authentication between GCKS and
the intended GM. When the authentication phase succeeds the GCKS supplies the joining
member:
 with all the information needed to start a DATA SA (that is in the case the group security
policy requires such a step right at registration and not, as the case may be, as a part of the
rekey protocol);
 with all the information needed to start a REKEY SA (provided the group security policy
requires a rekey protocol).
Obviously enough, the purpose of the registration protocol is to allow a secure (i.e.
authenticated and conﾙdential) transfer of the relevant information between the GCKS and
the GM over a SA. Such an SA is called Registration SA. An analogous protocol is dedicated
to the purpose of removing the REG SA (in case the GM has not chosen to do it itself).
The design of the registration protocol allows for a good level of ﾚexibility and provides
with the ability to support different scenarios. Any secure-channel protocol can be used to
deliver the registration messages (e.g. IPsec or TLS). In fact this is what is done with tunneled
GSAKMP (Harney et al., 2003). GDOI (see par. 2.4.2) uses IKE Phase 1 to get a secure channel
to download REKEY and/or DATA SAs. Authenticated Difﾙe-Hellman exchanges of the type
of IKE Phase 1 are used by protocols like MIKEY(see par. 2.4.3) and GSAKMP(see par. 2.4.1),
although they are adapted to increase operations’ efﾙciency.
If for some reason a GM loses the synch with the GSA, it might have to start over a registration
with the GCKS. However, there are cases where a simpler method to return in synch may be
available:
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 the GM can open a plain TCP connection to GCKS and get the recent rekey messages. To
open a TCP port to accept such requests might be seen as a dangerous exposition to DOS
attacks. In fact, malicious re-synch requests could be an even more serious problem;
 the GCKS could publish the rekey messages on a public (e.g. web) site for the GM to
download them from it.
It is desirable that the GCKS provides all three re-synching methods (i.e. new registration,
TCP connection, public download).
2.2.3 Rekey protocols
In case of KEK/TPK expiration or group membership changes, the GCKS may update the
REKEY SA. A REKEY SA is used to protect rekey messages.
The rekey protocol should possess the following properties:
 rekey information should reach GMs without excessive delays;
 the protocol must specify a way for the GM to contact the GCKS and proceed to a re-synch
in case of keys expiration and lack of updates;
 the protocol must avoid implosion problems (see par. 2.2.4) and guarantee reliability in the
delivery of rekey information.
The overall scalability of the group key management architecture relies heavily on the
performances of the rekey protocol. Therefore scalability must be considered a prerequisite
when designing a protocol intended to satisfy the above properties. Rekey protocol should
use a scalable Group Key Management Algorithm (GKMA) to send the minimum possible
number of keys in a rekey message. LKH (see par. 2.3), OFT (Balenson et al., 2000), Subset
difference based schemes (Lotspiech et al., 2001) are examples of GKMA.
A rekey protocol has the following objectives:
 the synchronization of a GSA;
 privacy, authentication (symmetric or asymmetric), replay protection, DOS protection;
 efﾙcient rekeying after changes in groupmembership or in case of keys (KEKs) expiration;
 allowing GMs to recovery synchronization with GSA;
 a reliable transport of rekey messages;
 good performances in throughput and latency;
 compatibility with multicast and multi-unicast.
A few major issues the design of the protocol must take into account are:
 messages format;
 reliable transport;
 feedback implosion;
 out-of-synch GSA recovery;
 the use of GKMA in rekey messages;
 GKMA interoperability.
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2.2.4 Reliable transport of rekey messages
The reliable transport of rekey messages is a crucial point in the design of the protocol.
The content of rekey messages is typically made of KEKs, TPKs, REKEY SA and DATA
SAs. Beyond conﾙdentiality and authentication, the protocol must support protection against
replay and DOS attacks. GCKS can send the messages to GMs by multicast or multi-unicast.
Conﾙdentiality of rekeymessages is obtained by encryption with the Group KEK. If a GKMA
is used, the encryption of each part of the rekey message will be performed according to the
GKMA speciﾙcations, by the pertinent KEKs.
For a GM to receive all intended data it is essential the GCKS is able to keep the SAs (DATA
SA and REKEY SA) of such GM in synch. Therefore the reliability of the rekeying mechanism
is a fundamental requirement. It can be achieved either by some procedure inherent to the
algorithm or by choosing a reliable transport for the rekey messages.
The following solutions have been proposed:
 transmission of multiple copies of the rekey message. It must be recalled that a rekey
message may span many IP packets;
 transport by an existing reliable multicast protocol or infrastructure;
 the use of Forward Error Correction (FEC) techniques (together with a feedback carried by
NACKs) (Yang et al., 2001).
There is an ample choice of reliable multicast protocols that could be used in our context.
While, as of this writing, none of them has started the standard track, a consensus has been
reached within IETF on two protocols (Adamson et al., 2009) which are therefore likely to start
the track not far from now.
Anyway, no particular reliable multicast protocol has been recommended by the IETF MSEC
WG (MSEC, 2011) to guarantee reliability in group rekeying. In fact, the choice of the protocol
could be subject to special application needs and to the operational environment. Nothing
prevents, in the future, the standard use of a particular protocol for the needs of each class of
applications.
A major problem arising when using a reliable multicast messaging protocol is implosion.
Reliable multicast protocols often make use of ACKs or NACKs to get a feedback about the
success of a particular transmission and to start a retransmission in case of failure. Any kind
of condition leading to massive packet losses at the receivers can result in the transmission of
NACKs from GMs to GCKS. The problem gets soon unmanageable with a large number of
GMs. It is referred to as "feedback implosion".
Implosion has been one of the main areas of interest in the topic of reliable multicasting. Some
of the solutions proposed to suppress or aggregate the feedback may be well suited in the
context of group key management. To reduce the feedback, trafﾙc members may be forced
to wait for a random time before sending a negative feedback. During such a wait GMs may
receive the needed updates and therefore avoid sending the feedback.
Feedback aggregation is another path followed by some reliable multicast protocols. In this
speciﾙc domain, however, the concept has drawbacks related to authentication issues. The
idea of local recovery (that is establishing local recovery servers to ofﾚoad the main server)
has the same type of problems since GMs should establish SAs with local servers. On the
other hand, any subordinate GCKS or even any GM with adequate privileges may act as a
local repair server and resend rekey messages.
The main purpose of a GKMA is to make rekeying scalable. Trying to manage a large group
without an effective GKMA is plainly unfeasible.
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The following points must be kept in mind when selecting a GKMA:
 Protection against collusion. GMs and non-members should not be able to join their
knowledge in order to discover keys they are not allowed to know (according to GKMA
keys’ distribution rules).
 Forward access control. The GKMAmust make sure a GMwhich has formally left the group
is no longer able to re-join it.
 Backward access control. The GKMA must make sure when a GM joins the group it cannot
decrypt past data.
In order to scale without difﾙculties GKMAs make generally use of a logical tree structure to
organize keys. Obviously there are many ways to manage key trees and to identify a node
within a key tree. Within each GKMA packet or at least during the initialization of a REKEY
SA the following information has to be provided:
 GKMA name (e.g., LKH, OFT, Subset Difference);
 GKMA version number (implementation speciﾙc). Version may imply several things such
as the degree of a key tree, proprietary enhancements, and qualify another ﾙeld such as a
key ID;
 number of keys or largest ID;
 version-speciﾙc data;
 per-key information:
– key ID;
– key lifetime (creation/expiration data);
– encrypted key;
– encryption key’s ID (optional).
2.3 Logical key hierarchy: a Group Key Management Algorithm
To multicast in a secure an efﾙcient way to a large group of users, a single TEK is generally
used for encrypting trafﾙc data. A crucial problem is represented by the users leaving or
joining the group. To illustrate it we will refer to ﾙgure 3. In theory, for each single change
in the users’ base, the TEK (KI in the ﾙgure) should be changed. Although grouping changes
occurred in a given time interval and updating TEK once for all of them might alleviate the
problem, the fact remains that a naive approach would mean transmitting the new TEK to
each of the GMs encrypted with the unique key each GM has from its very inception (the
KEK, Key Encryption Key, which the GCKS knows for all GMs, from KA to KH in ﾙgure 3). In
other words, the GCKS should send to the group as many copy of the encrypted TEK as the
number of GMs. That is an enormous trafﾙc for large groups and, even worse, a constantly
repeating one, considering the physiology of the "churn rate". The classical approach to
attenuate the problems is that of Logical Key Hierarchy (Wallner et al., 1999) (Wong et al.,
1998). Improvements of the LKH (Setia et al., 2000) (Rodeh et al., 1999) (Molva & Pannetrat,
1999) (Zhu et al., 2003) have been proposed with the main purpose of improving scalability of
security group associations, in particular during the rekeying phase.
In the tree of ﾙgure 4 the circles are keys and the squares are users. The tree has been
represented as a balanced binary tree for convenience although there is no particular
restriction on its structure. The "leaf" keys are the keys each node has been assigned before
91
Multicast Security and Reliable Transport of
Rekey Messages over Hybrid Satellite/Ter es rial N works
www.intechopen.com
10 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
GCKS
* *! *" *# *$ *% *& *'
) 
)(
)! )" )# )$ )% )& )'
Fig. 3. N Root/Leaf Pairwise Keys
joining the group (e.g. by a smart card). The GCKS must know them beforehand for all nodes.
KO is called root key. By grouping the users in small groups and recursively grouping small
groups in larger groups with a number of levels of grouping adapted to the expected total
population of nodes, a signiﾙcant reduction in rekeying trafﾙc can be achieved. Let’s see how
the basic idea is a GM is supposed to know all the keys on the tree path from itself to the root.
For example GM M16 must know, beyond its own KEK K16, Key KH , Key KL, Key KN , Key
KO (which is the TEK).
All the intermediate (auxiliary) keys (from KA to KN) do not need to be associated with any
physical device.
,0 ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,0/ ,00 ,01 ,02 ,03 ,04 ,05
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Fig. 4. LKH tree
2.3.1 Join operations
Suppose the userM3 wishes to join the group. First it will be assigned, in one of many possible
ways, its KEK K3, known only to itself and to GCKS. Next, with some reasonable criterion,
it will be associated to a subgroup (the subgroup with KEK KB in the ﾙgure 4). At this point
all the KEK from itself to the root (KB, KI , KM, KO) will have to be changed. They will be the
new keys: KB’, KI’, KM’, KO’. The new keys will have to be known from all the leaf nodes
under them in the tree. To have KB’ known to all nodes under it (M3 and M4) GCKS will
encrypt it with K3 and K4. To have KI ’ known to all nodes under it (from M1 to M4) GCKS
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will encrypt it with KB’ and KA. To have KM’ known to all nodes under it (from M1 to M8)
GCKS will encrypt it with KI ’ and KJ . Finally to have KO’ (the TEK) known to all nodes GCKS
will encrypt it with KM’ and KN . The total number of encrypted keys in the rekey message
will be d ∗ logd(n) where n is the number of GMs and d is the degree of the key tree. By this
scalable method all the GMs will be able to decrypt the new TEK using the auxiliary keys.
2.3.2 Leave operations
A typical situation is that of a GM leaving the group (e.g. a paying customer of a service
willing to unsubscribe from it). The management of the "leave" operation is very similar to
that of the "join" one. All the keys previously known to the leaving member will have to be
changed in the same way as above.
For a fully populated tree of degree d and height h (where h = logd(n)), the number of keys
retransmitted when a member leaves the group is d ∗ h − 1 and d ∗ h when a node joins the
group (Wong et al., 1998); this compares favorably with the cost of n for a ﾚat system.
2.4 Group key management protocols
A number of group key management protocol have been proposed. Within the multicast
security workgroup there are three protocols related to group key management already on
the standard track:
 Group Security Association Key Management Protocol (GSAKMP) (Harney et al., 2006).
It is intended to be the generic key management protocol and deﾙnes methods for policy
distribution, policy enforcement, key distribution, and key management.
 Group Domain of Interpretation protocol (GDOI) (Baugher et al., 2003). It uses the
ISAKMP phase 1 negotiation as the authentication protocol and sets by it a secure
connection between a receiver and the GCKS system. Phase 2 messages are deﾙned within
the protocol.
 Multimedia Inter KEYing (MIKEY) (Arkko et al., 2004). It is designed with real-time
applications in mind.
2.4.1 Group Security Association Key Management Protocol
The following roles are speciﾙed in GSAKMP (Harney et al., 2006):
 Group owner (GO), it is in charge of the policies creation;
 Group Member (GM), it is the end-user (sender or receiver) of all security related
procedures;
 Group Controller / Key Server (GCKS), it is responsible for the authentication of GMs, the
enforcement of policies, the distribution and management of keys;
 S-GCKS, A GMwhich can act locally as GCKSwhen the functions of GCKS are distributed.
Operations of GSAKMP are described for three different scenarios: in the default one a single
GM is the sender; in another one (support to which is mandatory) all GMs are potential
senders. Support to the third scenario (only a few among the GMs are senders) is left as
an option.
In order to enhance scalability, distributed operations are allowed through the set up of local
GCKS (S-GCKS). An S-GCKS can provide a better management to its neighboring GMs (e.g.
in corporate networks).
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GSAKMP operates under the assumption there is at least one PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)
for the group to trust. GSAKMP relies on such PKI while creating and verifying security
policy rules. The public key of the GO must be known in advance to all GMs.
Upon creation of a newmulticast group, the GO starts the process with the creation of a Policy
Token (PT) describing the rules for access control and authorizations for that group. The token
is signed by the GO. The token contains:
 identiﾙcation for the PT and group;
 access control rules dictating who can have access to the group keys;
 authorization rules stating who can be a SGCKS;
 mechanisms for handling security, e.g. Security Protocol, Key Creation Method, Key
encryption algorithm, Signature, etc.
After a PT is created and signed, it is sent by the GO to a potential GCKS. The latter veriﾙes
the signature and, based on the rules speciﾙed in the PT, decides whether it can act as a GCKS
for the new group. If it can, then the new group is established and all GMs have to register
with the GCKS (see Fig. 5). Upon receiving each registration request, the GCKS veriﾙes the
signature of the requesting GM and checks whether it is authorized to join the group. If the
checks succeeds, the GM receives a "Key download" message. On its part a GM has to verify
the GCKS has the authority to manage the group. Eventually, by using the information in the
message, a GM can set up both REKEY and DATA SAs. If the GM has no need to send data to
the group and it is planning to act as a receiver only, it will have no need to send a "Request to
join" message and the "Key download" message is simply sent to the GM after its registration.
Controller Member
Request To Join
Shared Keyed Group Session
NotiBcation - ACK/NACK
Key Download (Policy Token)
Fig. 5. GM registration in GSAKMP (from (Harney et al., 2006))
A rekeying is required whenever a GM joins or leaves the group and such operation will
involve the GO. The latter is informed about node changes and reacts by creating a new PT.
PTs must be pushed to the GCKS and the S-GCKS. Upon receiving a PT the GCKS nodes
have to check whether the changes involve their own GMs. With no changes, the PT will
be distributed according to the LKH by the use of the group key. If some of their nodes has
changed than each client must receive the new PT and the only way to do it safely is to encrypt
it according to the chosen GKMA and to send everything to every client.
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2.4.2 Group Domain of Interpretation protocol
With reference to the ISAKMP (Maughan et al., 1998) terminology, GDOI (Baugher et al.,
2003) speciﾙes a domain of interpretation for group key management. While the ISAKMP
speciﾙcation is no longer current (being obsoleted by IKEv2 (Kaufman, 2005)), part of its
framework is still used to detail the GDOI speciﾙcations.
The setup of secure connections is the result of a two-phases procedure in ISAKMP (and in
GDOI). In our terms, the ﾙrst phase allows to establish a secure unicast connection between
the clients and the GCKS. Phase 2 is dedicated to rekeying and the creation of DATA SAs.
Identities of the involved entities are known (together with authorizations) to the GCKS from
phase 1 but they can be integrated with certiﾙcates provided by the GO in phase 2.
Keys can be transmitted with two formats: GROUPKEY-PULL and GROUPKEY-PUSH. The
ﾙrst one is used by a GM in a client-server fashion to ask for TEKs, KEKs or KEKs arrays (with
LKH) according to its needs.
On the other hand, GROUPKEY-PUSH is used by the GCKS when it needs to force the update
of the REKEY SA or of the DATA SA.
2.4.3 Multimedia Inter KEYing protocol
The IETF WG has shown a deﾙnite interest in the protection of real-time trafﾙc. In particular,
the key exchange for SRTP (Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol) has been considered. The
MIKEY protocol’s design is the result of such focus. It is of use both in one-to-one and in
one-to-many exchanges.
The MIKEY (Arkko et al., 2004) protocol speciﾙes key management functionalities. It
simpliﾙes the architecture by allowing the sender to incorporate the functions of the GCKS.
The Group Control part of the operations, the user’s authentication, is performed throughout
the course of the initial key exchange by signed messages. The protocol’s emphasis on
real-time data is represented by its efforts to provide a lower latency, its consideration for
the usage over heterogeneous networks and for small groups’ interactive exchanges.
The distribution of TEKs is based on the use of either shared keys (distributed in advance) or
public keys encryption. With such methods the Trafﾙc Encryption Key Generation Key (TGK)
is a shared information between all hosts participating the session. Difﾙe-Hellman is used
for one-to-one connections instead. In this case each client connects to the source (or to the
separate GCKS node) and the TGK is different for each GM - GCKS pair.
To avoid the problems associated with the advance distribution of the shared keys, the use
of certiﾙcates signed by a trusted CA can be preferred. Procedures for rekeying are not
deﾙned in MIKEY (the protocol is supposed to be run each time the rekeying is needed).
MBMS (Multimedia Broadcast /Multicast Service) (3GPP, 2006) is an extension to the protocol
designed to allow multicast rekeying in certain environments.
3. Reliable multicast
The topic of the reliable transport of multicast trafﾙc has been already anticipated in par. 2.2.4,
especially with reference to the classic problem of feedback implosion. Here we’ll present
three candidate protocols for the reliable multicast transport of encryption keys.
While protocols based on FEC do generally perform better (Setia et al., 2002) we wish to draw
the attention to the fact that in a satellite environment, where the noise tends to be bursty and
often a return channel is missing, a protocol simply transmitting multiple copies of the rekey
messages might offer a viable alternative.
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The three protocols we wish to present are Pragmatic General Multicast (PGM) (see par. 3.1),
NACK-Oriented Reliable Multicast (NORM) (see par. 3.2 ) and our SRDP-Sign (see par. 3.3)
3.1 Pragmatic General Multicast (PGM)
”Pragmatic General Multicast (PGM) is a reliable transport protocol for applications that
require ordered or unordered, duplicate-free, multicast data delivery from multiple sources
to multiple receivers” (Speakman et al., 2001).
The protocol, developed by a large team of researchers, has the RFC status of "Experimental"
as of this writing. Its design puts emphasis on simplicity and does not support much more
than the essential capabilities for this class of protocols. Its main concern is the reduction of the
repair trafﾙc (driven from NACK implosion or caused by the useless feeding of redundancy
to receivers not needing it).
For better operation PGM needs support from the routers crossed by the multicast trafﾙc. That
is each router should run PGM-aware software (or ﾙrmware) extensions (or, put in different
terms, be a PGM NE or PGM-capable Network Elements). At any rate, the protocol can also
work, although less efﾙciently, when some or all of the routers are unaware of it.
PGM runs over the standard IP multicast. As customary with that protocol, GMs can join and
leave the groupwithout notifying the source. The only guarantee for a GM is that, once joined
the group, it will receive the data with no errors. Any GM can become an independent sender
for the group it belongs to and its identiﾙcation is given by a Transport Session Identiﾙer
that no one else can share. PGM is ﾚexible enough to support many different types of
applications "as disparate as stock and news updates, data conferencing, low-delay real-time
video transfer, and bulk data transfer". Other supplementary options include Designated
Local Repairer (DLR) support, fragmentation, late joining, and Forward Error Correction
(FEC).
The protocol gets its feedback about the transmission results in the form of NACKs. The
potential danger of a NACK implosion is reduced by NACK suppression and NACK
aggregation in PGM NE routers (see below).
PGM deﾙne the following type of packets:
 ODATA, the Original copy of the transmitted DATA;
 NAK, a Negative AcKnowledgement issued when the receiver realizes a packet is missing
in the sequence it received;
 NCF, NAK Conﾙrmation;
 RDATA, a Retransmission of the original DATA;
 SPM, Source Path Message.
3.1.1 PGM transmit window
Mimicking the strategies followed by unicast reliable protocols, PGM keeps a sliding window
within which to transmit data. The absence of data allowing to accurately shift the left side of
the window leads to the use of a few expedients (based on ﾙxed time waits, on a given period
without received NAKs etc.).
3.1.2 PGM tree
To forward data to the intended recipients, PGM builds its own distribution tree (PGM
tree) which is identical to the distribution tree natively built by the routers supporting the
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IP multicast protocol when all such routers are PGM NE. More generally, PGM builds the
distribution tree (the "overlay network") over the original IP multicast tree by having the
sender transmitting Source Path Messages (SPM) to the group at regular intervals during the
data transfer.
FROM SOURCE
PGM 
NE
1
PGM 
NE
2
Receiver 1
Receiver 2
Receiver 3
PGM 
NE
3
UPSTREAM
DOWNSTREAM
Fig. 6. PGM upstream/downstream attributes for router PGMNE2
SPMs are modiﾙed at each crossed PGM NE (see Fig. 6). When it reaches a PGM NE an SPM
packet contains the address of the PGM NE it comes from. Before forwarding the packet, a
PGM NE substitutes its own address to that address so that every PGM NE will always know
the address of its upstream closest PGM NE (Gemmell et al., 2003).
When ODATA packets start to ﾚow and a host detects amissing packet, after a random backoff
time it sends a NAK to the upstream PGM NE it knows because of the above procedure. On
its turn, the latter:
 sends back a multicast NCF packet by the interface that received the NAK;
 forwards to the PGM NE upstream the same NAK packet it received and receives an NCF
from it.
The process continues upstream until the source or a DLR is reached. When the NAK reaches
the source or a DLR, these may re-send the lost packet downstream to the multicast group,
either in the original form or by some FEC encoding.
3.1.3 Local repair: DLR
If no DLR were present, all the repair packets had to be re-sent by the source. The presence
of DLRs helps to reduce the outgoing trafﾙc at the source and to limit it to the multicast tree
97
Multicast Security and Reliable Transport of
Rekey Messages over Hybrid Satellite/Ter es rial N works
www.intechopen.com
16 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
portion downstream the DLR. It also helps to speed the repair procedure. DLR can announce
their presence so that PGM NEs can direct NAKs to them rather than to the source.
3.1.4 PGM with non-PGM-aware routers
PGM can operate even when all routers are not PGM-aware. Of course, with no PGM NE,
many of the features of the protocol are lost. For example, each NAK packet will be multicast
in the usual way, without the suppression of duplicated NAKs. It will be also impossible to
perform efﾙcient repairs, since RDATA packets will be transmitted again and again, no matter
how many GM have requested the same packet. The protocol performances will however
improve as the number of PGM NE increases.
3.1.5 Congestion control
Congestion control in PGM is performed by limiting the transmission rate at the source. Such
limitation is based on the feedback received both from receivers and from PGM NEs. The
feedback is given by appending special "report" ﾙelds at the end of a NAK packet. The reports
communicate the "load" measured by receivers, in the form of packet loss rates, or by PGM
NEs, in the form of packet drop rates.
The feedback can be of three different types:
 worst link load as measured by the PGM NEs;
 worst end-to-end path load as measured by the PGM NEs;
 worst end-to-end path load as reported by receivers.
Although congestion control is mandatory, there is no speciﾙcation of how this data should
be used to adjust the sending rate and the choice is left to the implementation (Gemmell et al.,
2003).
An extension of the protocol aimed at congestion control has been proposed with PGM CC
(Rizzo, 2000). PGMCC is described as "single rate" in that "all receivers gets the same rate
and the source adapts to the slowest receiver" and "TCP-friendly" in that the sender tries not
to transmit faster than the rate allowed by TCP speciﾙcations with the slowest receiver. The
protocol adopts a window-based, TCP-like control loop.
3.2 Negative-ACKnowledgment (NACK) Oriented Reliable Multicast (NORM)
According to (Adamson et al., 2009) The Negative-ACKnowledgment (NACK) Oriented
Reliable Multicast (NORM) protocol "can provide reliable transport of data from one or more
senders to a group of receivers over an IP multicast network". Efﾙciency, scalability, support
for heterogeneous IP networks and for bulk transfers are said to be the goals for the protocol’s
design. Another interesting target for the protocol is to provide "support for distributed
multicast session participation with minimal coordination among senders and receivers".
Starting with (Adamson et al., 2009), NORM is on the IETF standard track. In (Adamson et al.,
2009) message types and protocol operation are explained in detail. (Adamson et al., 2008)
discusses goals and challenges for reliable multicast protocols in general, deﾙnes building
blocks to address these goals and gives a rationale for the development of NORM.
End-to-end reliable transport of application data is based on the transmission of NACKs
from the receivers to initiate repair transmissions from the senders. Variability in network
conditions is taken care of by using adaptive timers for the protocol operations. The protocol
is designed to offer its transport services to higher levels in a number of ways in order to
satisfy the needs of different applications.
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NORM uses FEC in various ways. It can use it both in the encoding of the original
stream and in the repair trafﾙc sent to the group in response to NACKs from the receivers
(proactive/reactive FEC). In general, the more FEC redundancy is put in the original stream
the less NACKs will be received.
Most of the potential limitations of the scalability of the protocol come from the negative
feedback generated from receivers. NORM uses a probabilistic suppression of the feedback
based on exponentially distributed random backoff timers. To avoid disturbing the operations
of concurrent transport protocols (e.g. TCP) a congestion control scheme is speciﾙed, although
alternative choices are left to the implementers.
3.2.1 NORM building blocks
NORM is conceptually divided in three main blocks:
 NORM Sender Transmission, which takes care of data transmissions and reception of
feedback (NACK) messages;
 NORM Repair Process, which processes the feedback information and tells the ﾙrst block
what to retransmit;
 NORM Receiver Join Policies, relates to policies and procedures involving receivers
admission to the data distribution. While receiver joins are generally unconstrained, a
sender might wish to limitate the number of potential NACK senders in various ways.
Other functions (congestion control, error correction etc.) are delegated to further modules.
3.2.2 NORM operations
Messages in NORM are basically divided in sender messages and receiver messages:
NORM_CMD, NORM_INFO, and NORM_DATA message types are generated by senders
of data content NORM_NACK and NORM_ACK messages generated by receivers within a
session.
The NORM_DATA messages are used by senders to transmit application data and FEC
encoded repair packets while NORM_NACK messages are generated by receivers to
selectively request the retransmission of missing content. NORM_CMDmessages are used for
various management and probing tasks while NORM_ACK is the acknowledgementmessage
for such commands.
As it is customary in this class of protocols, the receivers schedule random backoff timeouts
before sending a NORM_NACKmessage, which could be repeated if the hoped-for repair has
not come. The sender doesn’t react to single NACK messages but rather tries to aggregate a
number of them to decide how much to "rewind" its transmission. When it deems the rewind
to be sufﾙcient, it proceeds to the actual retransmission.
3.2.3 Congestion control
Congestion control for NORM is described in (Adamson et al., 2009). It is an adaptation of
the TCP-Friendly Multicast Congestion Control (TFMCC) described in (Widmer & Handley,
2006). It is essentialy based on a rate-control approach rather than on the control of the
transmission window. The protocol speciﾙcation leave, freedom to opt for a window-based
approach like that of PGMCC.
99
Multicast Security and Reliable Transport of
Rekey Messages over Hybrid Satellite/Ter es rial N works
www.intechopen.com
18 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
3.3 Satellite Reliable Distribution Protocol for Signaling (SDRP-Sign)
The Satellite Reliable Distribution Protocol (SRDP) protocols (Tommasi et al., 2006) (Tommasi
et al., 2003) are reliable transport protocols designed with special attention to the use in
satellite applications. SRDP-Sign can be seen as an extension of the original SRDP protocol.
The two protocols use the same UDP port and implement two different types of transports:
SRDP-Bulk and SRDP-Sign. The ﾙrst one is FEC-based and it is used for bulk data transfers.
The second one is of the multi-send type (Tommasi et al., 2008) and has been originally
designed for signaling. Despite the original design focus of SRDP-Sign has been the use
with short messages (e.g. in multicast control applications) or more generally, with signaling,
its relative immunity to burst errors makes it interesting in the context we are examining
(Tommasi et al., 2009). One more reason of interest for the protocol is its capability to transmit
information to users who can receive information from a satellite but do not possess a return
channel. However reliability of transmissions cannot be assured with this subset of users.
For all other users, SRDP-Sign is capable of accepting a return feedback both via satellite and
terrestrially. The SRDP-Sign protocol is also optimized for a high number of users.
3.3.1 SRDP-Sign: Requirements and architecture
The requirements of the SRDP-Sign protocol are:
 high degree of scalability;
 fast delivery of messages;
 high resistance to burst errors;
 high probability of complete delivery of transmitted data for all users;
 guarantee of complete delivery of transmitted data for users with a return channel;
 limited use of control messaging between sender and receivers.
The objective of each session of the SRDP-Sign is to transmit messages M to R users.
Reliability is ensured via transmission of N multiple copies of the messages (Setia et al., 2002).
The SRDP-Sign protocol manages the transmission of a single message (SRDP-sign session).
The protocol can transmit multiple simultaneous sessions, that is the transmission of the
copies of two different sessions to be interlaced. Bundling more messages within a packet
is not permitted (see Fig. 7). This preserves the simplicity of packet management.
3.3.2 SRDP-Sign operations
SRDP-Sign ensures reliability of the transmission of a message M, replicating it in N packets.
Pi is the i-th reply in the N packets sequence. The delivery of a message is organized in two
phases. During the Winding phase, the sender is restricted to replicate the message and there
is no control. During the Unwinding phase, the sender makes an estimate of the number
of receivers who did not receive the packet during the Winding Phase through a scheme of
suppression of the number of receivers.
SRDP-Sign messages can be of the following types:
 DATA, a data packet;
 ABORT, sent to interrupt an ongoing session;
 STAT_REQ, a request to the receivers of a feedback about the correct reception of the
message;
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 STAT_REP, the answer to a STAT_REQ.
During the Winding Phase the sender transmits N copies (DATA) of the message M. In
case of a correct reception of a packet, a receiver ignores all other packets of that message.
The replicated packets are transmitted with exponential times that reduces the effects of the
potential burst errors (Tommasi et al., 2003).
During the Unwinding Phase the sender multicasts a STAT_REQ to check whether the R
receivers have received the message during the previous phase. This request is processed by
the receivers through an algorithm of probabilistic suppression of the NACKs. This behavior
has a high level of scalability (Nonnenmacher & Biersack, 1998). If a receiver sees the request
and has not received the message, then the probabilistic suppression comes into play and if it
results in an authorization to proceed, the receiver sends a STAT_REP to the source. A session
ﾙnishes when the last STAT_REQmessage in the sequence (see below) gets no answer. On the
other hand, as soon as a STAT_REP message is received by the source, it stops the sending of
STAT_REQ messages and proceeds to a newWinding Phase.
The ABORT message, when needed, is also repeated in a ﾙxed way (exactly ten times at
regular intervals).
time
Fig. 7. Transmission of multiple messages (M1 and M2 cannot be interlaced)
3.3.3 Scalable Feedback Suppression (SFS)
Ideally, after transmitting a packet, the sender would like to receive boolean information
(yes/no) related to the correct reception from all the receivers. In order to prevent NACK
implosion, the Scalable Feedback Suppression (SFS) algorithm causes the random selection
of a subset of all the receivers. Such subset is allowed to transmit a negative feedback to the
sender. Obviously, only the receivers with a return channel can participate to the selection.
The algorithm begins with the selection of an high number H (which represents a very
rough and imprecise estimate of the number of potential receivers). The ﾙrst STAT_REQ
transmission is executed and the value probability PH of 10
r (where r = −⌈log10H⌉) is
included in the message. A receiver that did not receive the original message is authorized to
reply only if it generates a pseudorandom value (between 0 and 1) and such value is lower
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than PH . If the sender receives even a single NACK, it will abort the Unwinding phase and
will re-initiate the Winding Phase (see Fig. 7). If, on the contrary, it does not receive any
NACK, the sender iterates the STAT_REQ transmission putting in the message a value of PH
of 10r+1. If the sender does not receive any NACK it increases the transmitted PH value until
it reaches 1. At this point it determines the message has been correctly received by everyone.
4. Performance evaluation
We set up an experimental network to test the performances of the PGM, NORM and
SRDP-Sign protocols in different scenarios. Given the scope of the present chapter only
a sample of the tests results are reported. The complete results will be the object of a
forthcoming publication.
For PGM we selected OpenPGM, an open source implementation available at (OpenPGM,
2011). OpenPGM it is not yet a ﾙnal release. The source code of a NORM implementation is
available at (NORM, 2007).
The network topology we employed in our test is characterized by an (hybrid) asymmetric
connectivity where a single sender is connected directly to the satellite uplink (1Mbit/s) and
a small multicast group of receivers has a unicast terrestrial return path to the sender. In this
topology, receivers have no access to the satellite uplink but, as it is usually the case, they can
receive from the downlink either through a satellite receiver connected to their LAN or by an
on-board card (see Fig. 8). The round trip time is about 600ms. We also considered a scenario
in which there is no return path to the sender and therefore no kind of feedback is sent by the
receivers.
We evaluated the performances of the protocols for various packet loss percentages at the
receivers caused by the satellite link. The test is conducted in an homogeneous network
with all receivers experiencing the same percentage of independent losses. The packet loss
is emulated using Dummynet (Carbone & Rizzo, 2010).
Protocol Parameter and value Meaning
NORM blocksize=64 Number of source packets per FEC coding block.
NORM parity=32 Number of FEC parity packets.
NORM auto=32 Number of proactively parity packets.
NORM unicastNacks NACK sent in unicast.
OpenPGM Transmission Group size = 64 Number of source packets per FEC coding block.
OpenPGM Proactively parity = 32 Number of proactively parity packets.
SRDP-Sign N=3 number of replies for each message.
Table 1. Conﾙguration Parameters
Protocols conﾙguration parameters used for the present selection of the results are shown in
table 1. To put the three protocols on a par, no PGM-aware router has been employed.
We calculated the Average Key Delivery Ratio (AKDR) and the data overhead to evaluate
the performances of the above reliable multicast protocols. AKDR is the ratio {number of
keys received}/{number of keys transmitted} averaged over all multicast group members.
Data overhead is the ratio {total amount of data transmitted}/{net amount of keys data
transmitted}.
Fig. 9a shows the results of the tests when a return channel is available, that is the receivers
are able to send a feedback to the sender. Fig. 9b shows the results with no return channel
available. Despite its simplicity and limited efﾙciency, it is interesting to note the fairly good
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Fig. 8. Test network topology
performances of SRDP-Sign with high packet losses. Increasing redundancy to compensate
for high error rates, generally tends to favour the efﾙciency of FEC based protocols as
compared to that of the replica-based ones. However, as our preliminary results suggest,
bursty environments (like the satellite ones) tend to level the comparison.
Fig.10 shows a somewhat expected outcome: since SRDP-Sign sends a ﾙxed number of
replicas in the winding phase, no matter how much noisy the transmission is, its overhead
is by far the largest at low levels of packet losses. On the other hand, when the level of
losses increases, also PGM and NORM are forced to retransmit packets, ending up in reaching
approximately the same amount of overhead as SRDP-Sign.
5. Conclusions
This chapter introduced the framework and the protocols IETF speciﾙed for a multicast
security architecture. Three different protocols for key exchange (registration and rekeying),
have been presented: GSAKMP, MIKEY, and GDOI. They were developed with different
settings in mind, since a single protocol was not believed to be able to support all the typical
scenarios in multicast security. LKH is used to allow the rekeying phases to efﾙciently scale
over a large number of users. If the keys are sent via multicast, which is common for large
groups and unavoidable with satellites, a reliable multicast transport is required. Three
protocols offering such service have been considered: PGM, NORM and SRDP-Sign. The
ﾙrst two of them have been debated within the IETF MSECWG. The third one was originally
conceived for the utilization in multicast signaling (i.e. the reliable delivery of short control
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(a) Receivers with a return path
(b) Receivers without return path
Fig. 9. Average Key Delivery Ratio
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Fig. 10. Data Overhead (receivers with a return path)
messages). However its promising behavior in a satellite environment has prompted to
test it in the present context. The preliminary results suggest that, while PGP and NORM
do generally perform better, high levels of packet losses (which are typical of the bursty
disruption of satellites transmissions) tend to put the simpler approach of SRDP-Sign in a
more favorable position.
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